Chinese Politics And Government Power Ideology And Organization Pdf
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- How Will the Coronavirus Reshape Democracy and Governance Globally?
- Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party
- Chinese Politics and Government: Power, Ideology and Organization
- China’s Global Threat to Human Rights
How Will the Coronavirus Reshape Democracy and Governance Globally?
The new coronavirus pandemic is not only wreaking destruction on public health and the global economy but disrupting democracy and governance worldwide. It has hit at a time when democracy was already under threat in many places, and it risks exacerbating democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation. Already, some governments have used the pandemic to expand executive power and restrict individual rights.
Yet such actions are just the tip of the iceberg. The coronavirus will likely transform other pillars of democratic governance—such as electoral processes, civilian control of militaries, and civic mobilization—and potentially reset the terms of the global debate on the merits of authoritarianism versus democracy.
This article surveys this wide spectrum of effects. Of course, much remains uncertain as long as the ultimate scope and severity of the crisis are unknown. As the pandemic penetrates lower-income and fragile states, it will likely have even more profound and unpredictable effects than those visible thus far. This article focuses on the first-order political effects of the pandemic and governmental responses to it.
Powerful second-order effects resulting from the unfolding global economic slowdown will pack a further governance punch. The overall picture is foreboding.
Civil society groups mobilizing responses on the front lines of the pandemic may reinforce democratic vitality at the local level. In some places, effective state responses may shore up trust in government or technocratic expertise. Electoral disruptions may spur needed innovations in election administration.
It is essential that supporters of democratic governance everywhere attend to this sweeping range of effects, both negative and positive, to identify entry points and interventions that can preempt long-term political damage and nurture potential gains. As many observers have begun to document, the pandemic is leading to a rapid expansion of executive power around the world, with potentially dramatic implications for democratic space.
The severe public health emergency of course requires extraordinary measures. But as the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law has highlighted , such responses should meet basic tests of necessity, transparency, and proportionality. It is also crucial that they be time-bound and subject to periodic review.
There are already signs that some governments are using the crisis to grant themselves more expansive powers than warranted by the health crisis, with insufficient oversight mechanisms, and using their expanded authority to crack down on opposition and tighten their grip on power.
Thus, the pandemic may end up hardening repression in already closed political systems, accelerating democratic backsliding in flawed democracies, and further bolstering executive power in democratic countries. Four interrelated areas of concern stand out in this rush toward new emergency powers and restrictions. Illiberal leaders are taking advantage of the crisis to further weaken checks and balances and erode mechanisms of accountability, thereby entrenching their positions of power.
In the Philippines, the parliament passed legislation granting President Rodrigo Duterte nearly limitless emergency powers. The Chinese government has censored information about its response and detained journalists who reported on the outbreak. In Jordan, the prime minister now has the authority to suspend freedom of expression. While enhanced surveillance is not per se antidemocratic, the risks for political abuse of these new measures are significant, particularly if they are authorized and implemented without transparency or oversight.
The pandemic has given governments in China, Russia, and other authoritarian states greater justification to deploy even more intrusive systems, including widespread use of facial recognition and social media monitoring. There is a risk that governments may use the current need to restrict public gatherings as a pretext to crack down on the wave of antigovernment protests that have roiled global politics over the past several years.
In Algeria , for example, where major protests last year pushed the government toward some political reforms, authorities have banned all protests, marches, and demonstrations. A key issue to watch is whether these bans stay in place indefinitely. Another concern is that they will be enforced in discriminatory ways, meaning that opposition protests could be curtailed while progovernment rallies are tolerated or encouraged.
Governments now also have a means to ban protests without officially saying so: shelter-in-place orders have the same effect. The health crisis will likely disrupt or distort democracy in other ways. These unfolding effects have received less attention to date, yet they will be essential to watch in the months ahead. The pandemic threatens to upend electoral processes around the world. The United States has already delayed several state-level presidential primary votes, and candidates have curtailed rallies and retail-style campaigning.
Ethiopia has as well. Many of these elections may also be postponed. Putting off elections means that citizens are at least temporarily deprived of their right to choose their leaders, at a time when leadership choices are of paramount importance.
Even where elections do proceed, the chilling effect on turnout could be considerable, particularly among elderly and vulnerable populations. Given the severity of the crisis, short-term postponements are understandable. In many countries, holding elections in the current context would create significant risks for voters as well as poll workers.
Yet some governments may also use the pandemic as a pretext to postpone elections indefinitely, or until a more politically convenient moment. In the coming months, it will be essential to monitor whether governments that postpone elections set a clear timetable for rescheduling the vote, in coordination with all relevant political actors.
On the positive side, the virus could spur innovations in electoral and voting processes that ensure greater preparedness for future shocks. Possible innovations include expanded early voting and vote-by-mail options, greater reliance on remote voting technologies and online voter registration, and new investments in voter education.
South Korea, for example, is taking steps to allow its citizens to vote from home or from hospitals in its upcoming parliamentary election. However, major shifts in electoral administration will also give rise to new complications and risks, and therefore require significant preparation. Online voting could be vulnerable to hacking and incite fears of foreign influence.
In countries with weak state and technological capacities, implementing certain innovations may not be feasible. Countries that have already pioneered new election technologies may have valuable lessons to share in this regard. Crisis responses may shift the balance of power between militaries and civilian authorities. In many countries, ranging from Iran and South Africa to Israel and Peru , the military is being called upon to enforce lockdowns and aid the pandemic response in other ways.
While this is almost certainly warranted in the immediate emergency period, it may open the door to increased military involvement in the economy and domestic affairs. In other places, crisis responses may entrench already diminished civilian control over military actors. Pakistan is embroiled in a struggle between military and civilian officials over the pandemic response, leading the security sector leadership to sideline the civilian prime minister and work directly with provincial-level administrations.
In Iran, military leaders appear to have assumed significant decisionmaking authority in managing the response. In countries where military actors have a history of human rights abuses, ceding more policing functions to the military may have problematic implications. On the other hand, in countries where military actors already exert high levels of political influence, an ineffective response may potentially weaken their public image as guarantors of stability. Emergency restrictions on movement, assembly, information, and privacy all work against vibrant civil society organization and action.
Yet at the same time, the crisis may spur new forms of mobilization or other innovations in activism. Activists and movements in different parts of the world are figuring out how to comply with physical distancing guidelines while still making their demands heard.
The crisis has already fueled new protests for example, in Egypt , and some existing protests have moved online. Of course, as civic activism moves online, further challenges may emerge, such as the dissipation of protest energy, a decline in public visibility, and the potential spread of extremist ideologies.
More online activism will likely spur even more restrictions in online spaces, whether internet disruptions such as throttling, shutdowns, and blocking of social media platforms; stepped-up surveillance; or punitive laws and regulations for online activities. But the crisis may also provide opportunities for movements to grow their constituencies by advocating on behalf of local communities.
Civic groups around the world are already responding actively, and in many cases valiantly, to the crisis. In China , for example, students have organized social media campaigns to raise money for hospitals in Wuhan, and publicized complaints that government-backed charities funneled emergency aid to government offices rather than hospitals.
In the Philippines , universities and newly formed civic groups are organizing to help vulnerable groups affected by government lockdowns. New mutual aid groups are also emerging in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Lucha movement has urged the government to step up its crisis response; in Afghanistan, citizens are coming together to volunteer their services.
This civic engagement may help blunt the negative narratives about the loyalty, authenticity, and effectiveness of civil society that illiberal leaders have been propagating in recent years.
It may also draw more resources into the sector, and possibly even weaken nationalist critiques of international support for civil society. The varying success of different types of governments at managing the crisis may reshape the important global debate about the relative desirability of authoritarian and democratic governance. It is too early to say which type of political system will prove more effective at managing the crisis.
Some authoritarian regimes have done relatively well so far, like Singapore and Vietnam, while others, like Iran, have done poorly. Among democracies, South Korea and Taiwan have performed admirably, while others, like Italy and the United States, have not. Yet the idea that a firm authoritarian hand is needed for dealing with the crisis may nevertheless gain wider ground, especially if China appears to keep the virus under control and the United States does not. The pandemic will exert enormous pressures on governance institutions in heavily affected countries—especially on health systems, but also on many other essential government functions, from education and food supply chains to law enforcement and border control.
Even in comparatively wealthy states, like Italy, Spain, and the United States, health systems in the worst-affected areas have already cracked under the weight of the pandemic.
Crisis responses will inevitably require triage well beyond the health sector, diverting government attention and resources from other vital functions and challenges. This problem will be exacerbated as more and more politicians, government leaders, and civil servants test positive for the virus, rendering governments less able to operate just when they need to be working overtime. The specter of the pandemic has also forced legislatures and government agencies to curtail operations or work remotely, resulting in inevitable losses of efficiency.
As the virus spreads more widely in weak states, these governance challenges will be even more pronounced. The acute public health emergency will be on a collision course with an abject lack of government capacity, frail institutions, limited government reach, and low citizen trust in leaders and corresponding reluctance to heed public health directives. Social distancing will be difficult to observe in crowded settlements, especially if residents are reliant on informal work to survive.
At the same time, governments in many developing countries will struggle to mobilize adequate resources to ease the effects of an economic recession. Robust international assistance efforts will be essential, but insufficient implementation capacity may hinder their effectiveness.
In countries already suffering from protracted conflict or instability , the pressures of the pandemic and resultant cascade of governance failures could lead to at least partial state collapse. The pandemic will strain basic sociopolitical cohesion in many states. The differential effects of the health crisis along key axes—rich vs.
The pandemic may compound those strains by exacerbating political polarization where it already exists. From India and Bolivia to Poland and the United States, many democracies are already suffering from rising animosity and tensions between contending political camps. But such a rallying effect likely requires political leaders to rise to the challenge and take a unifying approach, which goes against the populist playbook in use in many countries.
Tracking leadership styles and messages will be key to understanding the longer-term effects of the pandemic on sociopolitical cohesion. Government responses to the pandemic are likely to exacerbate graft and corruption in many countries. Crises involving urgent medical needs and scarce supplies inevitably present opportunities for smuggling, graft, price-gouging, and fraud.
Corruption undermines the effectiveness of public health responses, particularly if valuable resources are diverted from high-need areas or citizens are denied treatment if they refuse to pay bribes.
Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party
Introduction 1. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, who had returned to the political arena after his three previous defeats, the Chinese government began to pursue an open-door policy, in which it adopted a stance to achieve economic growth through the active introduction of foreign capital and technology while maintaining its commitment to socialism. The obvious aim of this policy shift was to rebuild its economy and society that were devastated by the Cultural Revolution. The policy shift also appears to have been prompted by recognition that the incomes of ordinary Chinese were so low, in comparison with incomes in other Asian economies, that the future of the Chinese state and the communist regime would be in jeopardy unless something was done to raise living standards of its people through economic growth. The government subsequently established a number of areas for foreign investment, including the special economic zones, open coastal cities, the economic and technology development zones, the delta open zones, the peninsula open zones, the open border citiees, and the high-tech industry development zones.
Xuetong Yan, Chinese Values vs. The liberal hegemony of the United States is fading and faces the growing challenges from other ideologies including those from China. There are three political values compete with each other in China, Marxism, economic pragmatism, and Chinese traditional values. The Chinese government tries to combine Marxism with Chinese traditional values. Such effort, however, may find its difficulties in achieving the assigned targets. Although the US liberalism is losing influence, it is still the most influential global ideology and will not be abandoned overnight.
Since President Xi Jinping came to power in , he has consolidated his control over the infamously opaque party, with many experts calling him the most influential Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. Politics and Government. Tensions between the Communist party and the nationalist Kuomintang, its primary rival, erupted into a civil war from which the Communists emerged victorious in Around 70 percent of its nearly ninety million members are men; farmers, herdsmen, and fishermen make up roughly 30 percent of its membership. The CCP convenes its National Party Congress NPC every five years to set major policies and choose the Central Committee, which comprises around members and alternates including ministers, senior regulatory officials, provincial leaders, and military officers.
Chinese Politics and Government: Power, Ideology and Organization
Since President Xi Jinping came to power in , he has consolidated his control over the infamously opaque party, with many experts calling him the most influential Chinese leader since Mao Zedong. Politics and Government. Tensions between the Communist party and the nationalist Kuomintang, its primary rival, erupted into a civil war from which the Communists emerged victorious in
The PRC consists of 22 provinces excluding the claimed Taiwan Province , four municipalities , five autonomous regions and two special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau with the latter operating in a separate political systems different from the PRC. Each local Bureau or office is under the coequal authority of the local leader and the leader of the corresponding office, bureau or ministry at the next higher level.
China’s Global Threat to Human Rights
The new coronavirus pandemic is not only wreaking destruction on public health and the global economy but disrupting democracy and governance worldwide. It has hit at a time when democracy was already under threat in many places, and it risks exacerbating democratic backsliding and authoritarian consolidation. Already, some governments have used the pandemic to expand executive power and restrict individual rights. Yet such actions are just the tip of the iceberg.
The ideology of the Chinese Communist Party has undergone dramatic changes throughout the years, especially during Deng Xiaoping 's leadership and now Xi Jinping 's leadership. In the early days of this party, the prevailing nationalism and populism in s China played an important part in the ideology of early communists such as Li Dazhao and Mao Zedong. On the one hand, Marxism was a spiritual utopia to the early communists, while, on the other hand, they modified or " Sinicized " some doctrines of communist ideology in a realistic and nationalist way to support their revolution in China. These ideological syntheses led to the emergence of the famous Great Leap Forward movement and the Cultural Revolution. In recent years, it has been argued, mainly by foreign commentators, that the CCP does not have an ideology, and that the party organization is pragmatic and interested only in what works. The party itself, however, argues otherwise. They therefore believe that their party ideology must be dynamic to safeguard the party's rule, unlike the Communist Party of the Soviet Union , whose ideology became "rigid, unimaginative, ossified, and disconnected from reality.
The impact of power, ideology, and organization on different spheres of Chinese society. The structure, process, and factors in Chinese foreign policy making.
September 1999, No.45
Chinese leaders are ramping up their ambitions for the global order. However, the problem is that, within China, President Xi is rolling out new systems to strengthen authoritarian control, raising concerns that Beijing seeks to make the international system more authoritarian as well. From a liberal democratic perspective, if Beijing succeeds in bringing about that vision, the world will be less free, less prosperous, and less safe. Deeper analysis indicates that there is ample reason for concern. Using those levers, however, will require liberal democracies to figure out what they stand for, what they want the global order to look like over the coming decades, and how to create more space within the international governance system for China and other developing nations without ceding ground on fundamental principles.
The CCP is officially organized on the basis of democratic centralism , a principle conceived by Russian Marxist theoretician Vladimir Lenin which entails a democratic and open discussion on policy on the condition of unity in upholding the agreed-upon policies. When the National Congress is not in session, the Central Committee is the highest body, but since the body meets normally only once a year most duties and responsibilities are vested in the Politburo and its Standing Committee , members of the latter seen as the top leadership of the Party and the State. Through these posts, the party leader is the country's paramount leader. The current leader is general secretary Xi Jinping , elected at the 18th Central Committee held on 15 November The official explanation for China's economic reforms is that the country is in the primary stage of socialism , a developmental stage similar to the capitalist mode of production.
Its reaction could pose an existential threat to the rights of people worldwide. At home, the Chinese Communist Party, worried that permitting political freedom would jeopardize its grasp on power, has constructed an Orwellian high-tech surveillance state and a sophisticated internet censorship system to monitor and suppress public criticism. Abroad, it uses its growing economic clout to silence critics and to carry out the most intense attack on the global system for enforcing human rights since that system began to emerge in the midth century. Now the government is increasingly attacking the critics themselves, whether they represent a foreign government, are part of an overseas company or university, or join real or virtual avenues of public protest. No other government is simultaneously detaining a million members of an ethnic minority for forced indoctrination and attacking anyone who dares to challenge its repression. And while other governments commit serious human rights violations, no other government flexes its political muscles with such vigor and determination to undermine the international human rights standards and institutions that could hold it to account.
In a state capitalist country such as China, an important influence on company reporting is the government, which can influence company decision-making. The nature and impact of how the Chinese government uses its symbolic power to promote corporate environmental reporting CER have been under-studied, and therefore, this paper aims to address this gap in the literature by investigating the various strategies the Chinese government uses to influence CER and how political ideology plays a key role. This study uses discourse analysis to examine the annual reports and corporate social responsibility CSR reports from seven Chinese companies between and And the data analysis presented is informed by Bourdieu's conceptualisation of symbolic power.
The CCP was founded as both a political party and a revolutionary movement in by revolutionaries such as Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. Those two men and others had come out of the May Fourth Movement and had turned to Marxism after the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Revolution of The CCP joined with the Nationalist Party in , and the alliance proved enormously successful at first.
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